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Abstract
The new cyber attack pattern of advanced persistent threat (APT) has posed a serious threat to modern society. This
paper addresses the APT defense problem, i.e., the problem of how to effectively defend against an APT campaign.
Based on a novel APT attack-defense model, the effectiveness of an APT defense strategy is quantified. Thereby,
the APT defense problem is modeled as an optimal control problem, in which an optimal control stands for a most
effective APT defense strategy. The existence of an optimal control is proved, and an optimality system is derived.
Consequently, an optimal control can be figured out by solving the optimality system. Some examples of the optimal
control are given. Finally, the influence of some factors on the effectiveness of an optimal control is examined through
computer experiments. These findings help organizations to work out policies of defending against APTs.
Keywords: cybersecurity, advanced persistent threat, cyber attack-defense model, optimal control problem,
optimality system
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the daily operation of most organizations, ranging from large enterprises and financial institutions to
government sectors and military branches, depends largely on computers and networks. However, this dependency
renders the organizations vulnerable to a wide range of cyber attacks. Traditional cyber attacks include computer
viruses, worms and spyware. Conventional cyber defense measures including firewall and intrusion detection turn out
to be effective in withstanding these cyber attacks [1, 2].
The cyber security landscape has changed drastically over the past few years. A new type of cyber attack —
advanced persistent threat (APT) — has posed an unprecedentedly serious threat to modern society. According to
report, many high-profile organizations have experienced APTs [3], and the number of APTs has been increasing
rapidly [4]. Compared with traditional cyber attacks, APTs exhibit two distinctive characteristics: (a) The attacker
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of an APT is a well-resourced and well-organized group, with the goal of stealing as many sensitive data as possible
from a specific organization. (b) Based on meticulous reconnaissance, the attacker is going to launch a preliminary
advanced social engineering attack on a few target users to gain footholds in the organization and then to gain access
to critical information stealthily and slowly [5–7]. Due to these characteristics, APTs can evade traditional detection,
causing tremendous damage to organizations. To date, the detection of APTs is far from mature [8, 9]. Consequently,
the APT defense problem, i.e., the problem of how to effectively defend against APTs, has become a major concern
in the field of cybersecurity.
As a branch of applied mathematics, optimal control theory aims to solve a class of optimization problems in
which, subject to a set of dynamic constraints, we seek to find a function (control) so that an objective functional
is optimized [10, 11]. In real world applications, the set of dynamic constraints represents a dynamic environment,
a control represents a time-varying strategy, and the objective functional represents an index to be maximized or
minimized. Optimal control theory has been successfully applied to some aspects of cybersecurity [12–19]. To our
knowledge, the APT defense problem has yet to be addressed in the framework of optimal control theory. To model
the problem as an optimal control problem, we have to formulate an APT defense strategy as a control, characterize
the state evolution of an organization as a set of dynamic constraints, and quantify the effectiveness of an APT defense
strategy as an objective functional. The key to the modeling process is to accurately characterize the state evolution
of an organization by employing the epidemic modeling technique [20].
Individual-level epidemic models refer to epidemic models in which the state evolution of each individual in
a population is characterized by one or a few separate differential equations. As compared with the coarse-fined
state-level epidemic models [21–26] and the intermediate degree-level epidemic models [27–33], the fine-coarsed
individual-level epidemic models can characterize spreading processes more accurately, because they can perfectly
accommodate the network topology. The individual-level epidemic modeling technique has been successfully applied
to areas such as the epidemic spreading [34–37], the malware spreading [38–43], and the rumor spreading [44]. In
particular, a number of APT attack-defense models have recently been proposed by employing this technique [45–48].
This paper focuses on the APT defense problem. Based on a novel individual-level APT attack-defense model,
the effectiveness of an APT defense strategy is quantified. On this basis, the APT defense problem is modeled as
an optimal control problem, in which an optimal control represents a most effective APT defense strategy. The
existence of an optimal control to the optimal control problem is proved, and an optimality system for the optimal
control problem is derived. Therefore, an optimal control can be figured out by solving the optimality system. Some
examples of the optimal control are presented. Finally, the influence of some factors on the effectiveness of an optimal
control is examined through computer simulations. To our knowledge, this is the first time the APT defense problem
is dealt with in this way. These findings help organizations to work out policies of defending against APTs.
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The remaining materials are organized in this fashion. Section 2 models the APT defense problem as an optimal
control problem. Section 3 studies the optimal control problem. Some most effective APT defense strategies are given
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the influence of different factors on the optimal effectiveness. This work is closed
by Section 6.
2. The modeling of the APT defense problem
The goal of this paper is to solve the following problem:
The APT defense problem: Defend an organization against APTs in an effective way.
To achieve the goal, we have to model the problem. The modeling process consists of the following four steps:
Step 1: Introduce preliminary terminologies and notations.
Step 2: Establish an APT attack-defense model.
Step 3: Quantify the effectiveness of an APT defense strategy.
Step 4: Model the APT defense problem as an optimal control problem.
Now, let us proceed by following this four-step procedure.
2.1. Preliminary terminologies and notations
Consider an organization with a set of N computer systems labeled 1, 2, · · · ,N. Let G = (V, E) denote the access
network of the organization, where (a) each node stands for a system, i.e., V = {1, 2, · · · ,N}, and (b) (i, j) ∈ E if and
only if system i has access to system j. Let A =
[
ai j
]
N×N
denote the adjacency matrix for the network, i.e., ai j = 1 or
0 according as (i, j) ∈ E or not.
Suppose an APT campaign to the organization starts at time t = 0 and terminates at time t = T . Suppose at any
time t ∈ [0, T ] every node in the organization is either secure, i.e. under the defender’s control, or compromised, i.e.,
under the attacker’s control. Let Xi(t) = 0 and 1 denote the event that node i is secure and compromised at time t,
respectively. The vector
X(t) = [X1(t), X2(t), · · · , XN(t)] (1)
stands for the state of the organization at time t. Let S i(t) and Ci(t) denote the probability of the event that node i is
secure and compromised at time t, respectively. That is,
S i(t) = Pr {Xi(t) = 0} , Ci(t) = Pr {Xi(t) = 1} . (2)
As S i(t) +Ci(t) ≡ 1, the vector
C(t) = [C1(t), · · · ,CN(t)]
T (3)
stands for the expected state of the organization at time t.
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From the attacker’s perspective, each secure node in the organization is subject to the external attack. Let ai denote
the cost per unit time for attacking a secure node i. The vector
a = [a1, · · · , aN] (4)
stands for an attack strategy. Additionally, each secure node is vulnerable to all the neighboring compromised nodes.
From the defender’s perspective, each secure node in the organization is protected from being compromised. Let
xi(t) denote the cost per unit time for protecting the secure node i at time t. The vector-valued function
x(t) = [x1(t), · · · , xN(t)] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T (5)
stands for a prevention strategy. Additionally, each compromised node in the organization is revovered. Let yi(t)
denote the cost per unit time for recovering the compromised node i at time t. The vector-valued function
y(t) =
[
y1(t), · · · , yN(t)
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (6)
stands for a recovery strategy. We refer to the vector-valued function
u(t) =
[
x(t), y(t)
]
=
[
x1(t), · · · , xN(t), y1(t), · · · , yN(t)
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (7)
as an APT defense strategy.
2.2. An APT attack-defense model
For fundamental knowledge on differential dynamical systems, see Ref. [49]. For our purpose, let us impose a set
of hypotheses as follows.
(H1) Due to the external attack and prevention, a secure node i gets compromised at time t at the average rate
ai
xi(t)
.
The rationality of this hypothesis lies in that the average rate is proportional to the attack cost per unit time and
is inversely proportional to the prevention cost per unit time.
(H2) Due to the internal infection and prevention, a secure node i gets compromised at time t at the average rate
β
∑N
j=1 a jiC j(t)
xi(t)
, where β > 0 is a constant, which we refer to as the infection force. The rationality of this assumption
lies in that the average rate is proportional to the probability of each neighboring node being compromised and
is inversely proportional to the prevention cost per unit time.
(H3) Due to the recovery, a compromised node i becomes secure at time t at the average rate yi(t). The rationality of
this assumption lies in that the average rate is proportional to the recovery cost per unit time.
According to these hypotheses, the state transitions of a node are shown in Fig. 1. Hence, the time evolution of
the expected state of the organization obeys the following dynamical system:
dCi(t)
dt
=
1
xi(t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 −Ci(t)] − yi(t)Ci(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · ,N. (8)
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We refer to the model as the APT attack-defense model.
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Figure 1. The diagram of state transitions of a node under the hypotheses (H1)-(H3).
The APT attack-defense model can be written in matrix-vector notation as
dC(t)
dt
= F(C(t), u(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (9)
2.3. The effectiveness of an APT defense strategy
The defender’s goal is to find the most effective APT defense strategy. To achieve the goal, we have to quantify the
effectiveness of an APT defense strategy. For this purpose, let us introduce an additional set of hypotheses as follows.
(H4) The prevention cost per unit time is bounded from above by x and from below by x > 0, and the recovery cost
per unit time is bounded from above by y and from below by y > 0. That is, the admissible set of APT defense
strategies is given by
U =
{
u ∈
(
L2[0, T ]
)2N
| 0 < x ≤ xi(t) ≤ x, 0 < y ≤ yi(t) ≤ y, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
, (10)
where L2[0, T ] denote the set of all the Lebesgue square integrable functions defined on the interval [0, T ] [50].
(H5) The amount of losses caused by a compromised node i in the infinitesimal time interval [t, t + dt] is widt, where
wi =
∑N
j=1 ai j stands for the out-degree of node i in the network. The rationality of this hypothesis lies in that
the more nodes a node has access to, the more serious the consequence when it is compromised [51, 52].
According to the hypotheses, the expected loss of the organization in the time horizon [0, T ] when implementing
an APT defense strategy u =
[
x, y
]
is
Loss(u) =
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
wiCi(t)dt, (11)
and the overall cost for implementing the APT defense strategy is
Cost(u) =
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[
xi(t) + yi(t)
]
dt. (12)
Hence, the effectiveness of the APT defense strategy u can be measured by the quantity
J(u) = Loss(u) +Cost(u) =
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
wiCi(t)dt +
N∑
i=1
∫ T
0
[
xi(t) + yi(t)
]
dt. (13)
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Obviously, the smaller this quantity, the more effective the APT defense strategy. Let
L(C(t), u(t)) =
N∑
i=1
[wiCi(t) + xi(t) + yi(t)]. (14)
Then
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(C(t), u(t))dt. (15)
2.4. The modeling of the APT defense strategy
Based on the previous discussions, the APT defense problem boils down to the following optimal control problem:
min
u∈U
J(u) =
∫ T
0
L(C(t), u(t))dt,
subject to
dC(t)
dt
= F(C(t), u(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
C(0) = C0.
(16)
Here, each control stands for an APT defense strategy, the objective functional stands for the effectiveness of an
APT defense strategy, the set of constraints stands for the time evolution of the expected state of the organization, an
optimal control stands for a most effective APT defense strategy, and the optimal value stands for the effectiveness of
a most effective APT defense strategy.
3. A theoretical analysis of the optimal control problem
For fundamental knowledge on optimal control theory, see Refs. [10, 11]. This section is devoted to studying the
optimal control problem (16).
3.1. The existence of an optimal control
As an optimal control to the problem (16) represents a most effective APT defense strategy, it is critical to show
that the problem does have an optimal control. For this purpose, we need the following lemma [11].
Lemma 1. Problem (16) has an optimal control if the following five conditions hold simultaneously.
(C1) U is closed and covex.
(C2) There is u ∈ U such that the adjunctive dynamical system is solvable.
(C3) F(C, u) is bounded by a linear function in C.
(C4) L(C, u) is convex on U .
(C5) L(C, u) ≥ c1||u||
ρ + c2 for some vector norm || · ||, ρ > 1, c1 > 0 and c2.
Next, let us show that the five conditions in Lemma 1 indeed hold.
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Lemma 2. The admissible set U is closed.
Proof: Let u = (x1, · · · , xN , y1, · · · , yN) be a limit point of U , u
(n) =
(
x
(n)
1
, · · · , x
(n)
N
, y
(n)
1
, · · · , y
(n)
N
)
, n = 1, 2, · · · , be a
sequence of points in U that approaches u. As
(
L2[0, T ]
)2N
is complete, we have u ∈
(
L2(0, T )
)2N
. Hence, the claim
follows from the observation that
x ≤ xi(t) = lim
n→∞
x
(n)
i
(t) ≤ x, y ≤ yi(t) = lim
n→∞
y
(n)
i
(t) ≤ y, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (17)
Lemma 3. The admissible set U is convex.
Proof: Let u(1) =
(
x
(1)
1
, · · · , x
(1)
N
, y
(1)
1
, · · · , y
(1)
N
)
, u(2) =
(
x
(2)
1
, · · · , x
(2)
N
, y
(2)
1
, · · · , y
(2)
N
)
∈ U , 0 < η < 1. As
(
L2[0, T ]
)2N
is
a real vector space, we get (1 − η)u(1)(t) + ηu(2)(t) ∈
(
L2[0, T ]
)2N
. So, the claim follows from the observation that
x ≤ (1 − η)x
(1)
i
(t) + ηx
(2)
i
(t) ≤ x, y ≤ (1 − η)y
(1)
i
(t) + ηy
(2)
i
(t) ≤ y, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (18)
Lemma 4. There is u ∈ U such that the associated adjunctive dynamical system is solvable.
Proof: Consider the adjunctive dynamical system
dC(t)
dt
= F(C(t), u), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (19)
where u(t) ≡ u = (x, · · · , x, y, · · · , y). As F(C, u) is continuously differentiable, the claim follows from the Continua-
tion Theorem for Differential Dynamical Systems [49].
Lemma 5. F(C, u) is bounded by a linear function in C.
Proof: The claim follows from the observation that for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , i = 1, 2, · · · ,N,
1
xi(t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 −Ci(t)] − yi(t)Ci(t) ≤ 1x
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 − yCi(t). (20)
Lemma 6. L(C, u) is convex on U .
Proof: Let u(1), u(2) ∈ U , 0 < η < 1. Then
L
(
C, (1 − η)u(1) + ηu(2)
)
= (1 − η)L
(
C, u(1)
)
+ ηL
(
C, u(2)
)
. (21)
Lemma 7. L(C, u) ≥ 1
max{x,y}
||u||2
2
.
Proof: We have
L(C, u) =
N∑
i=1
(wiCi + xi + yi) ≥
N∑
i=1
(xi + yi) ≥
N∑
i=1
 x
2
i
x
+
y2
i
y
 ≥ 1
max{x, y}
||u||22. (22)
Based on Lemmas 1-7, we get the following result.
Theorem 1. The problem (16) has an optimal control.
This theorem guarantees that there is a most effective APT defense strategy.
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3.2. The optimality system
It is known that the optimality system for an optimal control problem offers a method for numerically solving the
problem. This subsection is intended to present the optimality system for the problem (16). For this purpose, consider
the corresponding Hamiltonian
H(C(t), u(t), λ(t)) =
N∑
i=1
[
wiCi(t) + xi(t) + yi(t)
]
+
N∑
i=1
λi(t)

1
xi(t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 −Ci(t)] − yi(t)Ci(t)
 .
where λ = (λ1, · · · , λN)
T is the adjoint.
Theorem 2. Suppose u∗ is an optimal control to the problem (16), C∗ is the solution to the adjunctive dynamical
system with u = u∗. Then, there exists λ∗ with λ∗(T ) = 0 such that for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,

dλ∗
i
(t)
dt
= −wi + y
∗
i (t)λ
∗
i (t) +
λ∗
i
(t)
x∗
i
(t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC
∗
j(t)
 − β
N∑
j=1
ai j[1 −C
∗
j
(t)]λ∗
j
(t)
x∗
j
(t)
,
x∗i (t) = max
min

λ∗i (t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC
∗
j (t)
 [1 − C∗i (t)]

1
2
, x
 , x
 ,
y∗i (t) =

y, λ∗i (t)C
∗
i (t) < 1,
y, λ∗i (t)C
∗
i (t) > 1,
Proof: According to the Pontryagin Minimum Principle [10], there exists λ∗ such that
dλ∗
i
(t)
dt
= −
∂H(C∗(t), u∗(t), λ∗(t))
∂Ci
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
Thus, the first N equations in the claim follow by direct calculations. As the terminal cost is unspecified and the final
state is free, the transversality condition λ∗(T ) = 0 holds. By using the optimality condition
u∗(t) = argmin
u∈U
H(C∗(t), u(t), λ∗(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
we get (a) either
∂H(C∗(t), u∗(t), λ∗(t))
∂xi
= 1 −
λ∗
i
(t)(
x∗
i
(t)
)2
ai + β
N∑
i=1
a jiC
∗
j (t)
 [1 − C∗i (t)] = 0
or x∗
i
(t) = x or x∗
i
(t) = x, and (b)
y∗i (t) = arg min
y≤yi(t)≤y
(
1 − λ∗i (t)C
∗
i (t)
)
yi(t) =

y, λ∗i (t)C
∗
i (t) < 1,
y, λ∗i (t)C
∗
i (t) > 1.
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Combining the above discussions, we get the optimality system for the problem (16) as follows.

dCi(t)
dt
=
1
xi(t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 −Ci(t)] − yi(t)Ci(t),
dλi(t)
dt
= −wi + yi(t)λi(t) +
λi(t)
xi(t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 − β
N∑
j=1
ai j[1 −C j(t)]λ j(t)
x j(t)
,
xi(t) = max
min

λi(t)
ai + β
N∑
j=1
a jiC j(t)
 [1 − Ci(t)]

1
2
, x
 , x
 ,
yi(t) =

y, λi(t)Ci(t) < 1,
y, λi(t)Ci(t) > 1,
(23)
where C(0) = C0, λ(T ) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
Applying the forward-backward Euler scheme to the optimality system, we can obtain an optimal control to the
problem (16), i.e, a most effective APT defense strategy.
4. Some most effective APT defense strategies
In this section, we give some most effective APT defense strategies by solving the optimality system (23). For
ease in observation, let us introduce two functions as follows. For an admissible control u to the problem (16), define
the cumulative effectiveness (CE) as
CE(t; u) =
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
wiCi(s)ds +
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
[
xi(s) + yi(s)
]
ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (24)
and define the superposed control (SC) as
SC(t; u) =
N∑
i=1
[
xi(t) + yi(t)
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (25)
Obviously, we have CE(T ; u) = J(u).
For some optimal control problems, let us give the cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for an optimal
control.
Example 1. Consider the problem (16) in which G is a scale-free network with N = 100 nodes that is generated by
executing the algorithm given in Ref. [53], T = 20, β = 0.001, x = y = 0.1, x = y = 0.7, ai = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N,
and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. An optimal control to the problem is obtained by solving the optimality system (23).
Fig. 2 plots the cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for the optimal control. For comparison purpose, the
cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for three admissible static controls are also shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2. The cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for the optimal control and a few static controls in Example 1.
Example 2. Consider the problem (16) in which G is a small-world network with N = 100 nodes that is generated
by executing the algorithm given in Ref. [54], T = 20, β = 0.001, x = y = 0.1, x = y = 0.7, ai = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N,
and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. An optimal control to the problem is obtained by solving the optimality system (23). Fig.
3 depicts the cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for the optimal control. For comparison purpose, the
cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for three admissible static controls are also shown in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3. The cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for the optimal control and a few static controls in Example 2.
Example 3. Consider the problem (16) in which G is a realistic network given in Ref. [55], T = 20, β = 0.001,
x = y = 0.1, x = y = 0.7, ai = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N, and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. An optimal control to the problem is
obtained by solving the optimality system (23). Fig. 4 exhibits the cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for
the optimal control. For comparison purpose, the cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for three admissible
static controls are also shown in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4. The cumulative effectiveness and superposed control for the optimal control and a few static controls in Example 3.
It is seen from the above three examples that a most effective APT defense strategy is significantly superior to
any static APT defense strategy in terms of the effectiveness. This observation justifies our method. Additionally, the
superposed control drops rapidly to a lower value.
5. Further discussions
This section is devoted to examining the influence of different factors on the optimal effectiveness of an admissible
APT defense strategy. For ease in understanding these influences, let us introduce three quantities as follows. For an
optimal control u∗ to the problem (16), let OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗ denote the corresponding expected loss, overall cost,
and effectiveness, respectively. That is,
OL∗ = Loss(u∗), OC∗ = Cost(u∗), OJ∗ = OL∗ + OC∗ = J(u∗). (26)
5.1. The bounds on the admissible controls
Definitely, the four bounds on the admissible controls affect the optimal effectiveness of an admissible APT de-
fense strategy. Now, let us examine these influences.
Example 4. Consider a set of problems (16) in which G is the scale-free network generated in Example 1, T = 20,
β = 0.001, ai = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N, and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N.
(a) Let y = 0.1, y = 0.7. Fig. 5(a)-(c) exhibits the influence of x and x on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗, respectively.
(b) Let x = 0.1, x = 0.7. Fig. 5(d)-(f) displays the influence of y and y on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗, respectively.
11
Figure 5. The influence of the four bounds on OL∗, OC∗ , and OJ∗ in Example 4.
Figure 6. The influence of the four bounds on OL∗, OC∗ , and OJ∗ in Example 5.
Example 5. Consider a set of problems (16) in which G is the small-world network generated in Example 2, T = 20,
β = 0.001, ai = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N, and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N.
(a) Let y = 0.1, y = 0.7. Fig. 6(a)-(c) exhibits the influence of x and x on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗, respectively.
(b) Let x = 0.1, x = 0.7. Fig. 6(d)-(f) displays the influence of y and y on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗, respectively.
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Example 6. Consider a set of problem (16) in which G is the realistic network given in Example 3, T = 20, β = 0.001,
ai = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N, and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N.
(a) Let y = 0.1, y = 0.7. Fig. 7(a)-(c) exhibits the influence of x and x on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗, respectively.
(b) Let x = 0.1, x = 0.7. Fig. 7(d)-(f) displays the influence of y and y on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗, respectively.
Figure 7. The influence of the four bounds on OL∗, OC∗ , and OJ∗ in Example 6.
The following conclusions are drawn from the above three examples.
(a) With the increase of the two lower bounds, OL∗ goes down, but OC∗ and OJ∗ go up. In practice, the two lower
bounds should be chosen carefully so that a balance between the expected loss and the overall cost is achieved.
(b) The influence of the two upper bounds on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗ is almost negligible.
5.2. The network topology
Obviously, the topology of the network in an organization affects the optimal effectiveness of an admissible APT
defense strategy. Now, let us inspect this influence.
Example 7. Consider a set of problems (16) in which G ∈ {Gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ 7}, where Gi is a scale-free network with
N = 100 nodes and a power-law exponent of γi = 2.7+ 0.1× i, T = 20, β = 0.001, x = y = 0.1, x = y = 0.7, ai = 0.1,
0 ≤ i ≤ N, and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. Figure 8 displays the influence of the power-law exponent on OL
∗, OC∗, and
OJ∗, respectively.
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Figure 8. The influence of the power-law exponent of a scale-free network on OL∗, OC∗ , and OJ∗ in Example 7.
It is seen from this example that, with the increase of the power-law exponent of a scale-free network,OL∗ andOJ∗
decline, but OC∗ inclines. It is well known that the heterogeneity of a scale-free network increases with its power-law
exponent. Therefore, a homogeneously mixed access network is better in terms of the optimal defense effectiveness.
Example 8. Consider a set of problems (P) in which G ∈ {Gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ 5}, where Gi is a small-world network with
N = 100 nodes and an edge-rewiring probability of pi = 0.1× i, T = 20, β = 0.001, x = y = 0.1, x = y = 0.7, ai = 0.1,
0 ≤ i ≤ N, and Ci(0) = 0.1, 0 ≤ i ≤ N. Figure 9 exhibits the influence of the edge-rewiring probability on OL
∗, OC∗,
and OJ∗, respectively.
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Figure 9. The influence of the edge-rewiring probability of a small-world network on OL∗, OC∗, and OJ∗ in Example 8.
It is seen from this example that, with the increase of the randomness of a small-world network, OL∗, OC∗, and
OJ∗ rise rapidly. Hence, a randomly connected access network is better from the perspective of the optimal defense
effectiveness.
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6. Concluding remarks
This paper has addressed the APT defense problem, i.e., the problem how to effectively defend against APTs.
By introducing an APT attack-defense model and quantifying the effectiveness of an APT defense strategy, we have
modeled the APT defense problem as an optimal control problem in which an optimal control represents a most
effective APT defense strategy. Through theoretical study, we have presented the optimality system for the optimal
control problem. This implies that an optimal control can be derived by solving the optimality system. The influence
of some factors on the optimal effectiveness of an APT defense strategy has been examined.
There are many relevant problems to be resolved. The expected loss and overall cost of an APT defense strategy
should be appropriately balanced to adapt to specific application scenarios. In practice, the implementation of a
recommended defense strategy needs a great effort; the security level of all the systems in an organization must be
labelled accurately [6], the defense budget must be made, and the robustness of the defense strategy must be evaluated.
As the topology of the access network in an organization may well vary with time, the approach proposed in this work
should be adapted to time-varying networks [56–59]. It is of practical importance to deal with the APT defense
problem in the game-theoretical framework, where the attacker is strategic [60–63].
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